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Abstract 
The paper examines how much children and responsibilities related with them contribute towards 
the divergence of men’s and women’s wages, and consequently, to the formation of the gender 
wage gap. To derive the relative contribution of gender specific wage inequalities caused by the 
parenthood to the overall gender wage gap, we provide a modification of standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method. Contrary to our expectations, the findings show that most of the gender 
wage inequality is due to the positive wage gap between men who do and do not have children and 
not due to the wage penalty incurred by mothers. 
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1. Introduction 
Existing literature has documented that having children may contribute towards lower wages for 
women and a slight wage premium for men compared to childless individuals. Although child and 
marriage controls were originally primarily used to control for unmeasured human capital 
misspecification and unmeasured productivity (Hill, 1979), the investigation of the effects of these 
two factors on the wage level has recently gained researcher’s greater attention. The growing 
research on these topics has led to the appearance of such terms as a ‘motherhood penalty’ or a 
‘family gap’ and a ‘fatherhood premium’ (Waldfogel, 1997, Waldfogel, 1998, Budig and England, 
2001, Anderson et al., 2002, Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002, Lundberg and Rose, 2002). 
Despite the growing empirical research on the wage gaps between parents and childless individuals, 
no clear link between the parenthood effects on wages and the gender wage gap has been 
established. However, there are strong reasons to expect that - given the positive effect of children 
on the men’s wages and the negative effect on the wages of women - parenthood is likely to 
contribute significantly to the divergence of the wages of men and women and consequently to the 
evolution of the gender wage gap.  
In this paper, we combine the two fields of the research on the wage effects of parenthood and 
gender wage inequality, by proposing a gender wage gap decomposition that directly accounts for an 
existence of the wage differences between male and female parents and childless individuals. We 
carry out the analysis for Hungary and Poland, examining the magnitudes of the gaps in wages due to 
gender and parenthood, and the contribution of the family gaps to the gender wage differential. 
Poland and Hungary represent transition economies, for which the wage inequalities caused by the 
parenthood have not been studied so far as most of the research has concentrated on Western 
countries, especially the US, UK, Germany, as well as Denmark and the Netherlands.
1,2
  The two 
countries also differ in the policies and benefits provided to families with children, which are likely to 
influence individual’s, and especially women’s, labor market activity (Fodor et al., 2002).
3
   
Our empirical strategy aimed at deriving the contribution of the family gaps among men and women 
to the overall gender wage gap is based on several stages. First, we estimate wage equations for men 
and women as well as parents and nonparents. We recognize that in most of the existing literature, 
estimates of the parenthood effect may be biased due to the multiple selection processes that are 
present: 1) selection into being employed and 2) the choice of the parenthood status. We address 
these methodological problems using Dubin’s and McFadden’s selection correction model (Dubin 
and McFadden, 1984). In the second step, we use the estimated wage equations and concentrate on 
the gender wage gap decomposition. In order to directly assess the relative contribution of the family 
gaps among men and women to the overall gender wage gap, we propose a modification of Oaxaca-
Blinder mean decomposition (1973).  
Our findings suggest that the existence of the gender wage gap is largely due to the positive wage 
gap between men who do and do not have children. In Hungary, the family gap among women is 
entirely explained by women’s selection into employment and motherhood, and it is not found to 
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 On the other hand, transition economies were throughout investigated with regards to the changing gender 
disaggregated wage structure following the collapse of communism (see for example: Brainerd, 2000; Pailhé, 
2002). 
2
 A comprehensive cross-country analysis of the family gaps in Europe includes eleven European countries but 
all of them represent Western European economies (Davies and Pierre, 2005). 
3
 Hungary provides universal benefits for women, whereas Poland follows very strict means-tested eligibility 
criteria for the benefits. Also the maternity leave varies in these two countries. While in Poland over the years 
2004-2009 the maternity leave was around 14-18 weeks, in Hungary it was 24 weeks. Consequently, Hungary is 
recognized as a country that provides better chances for women to combine their work and family obligations. 
In Poland, where the share of children in the state child centers is among the lowest across the European 
countries, the child care is mainly delivered by women, lowering their participation rates at the labor market 
and involvement in the paid employment.  
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constitute a significant portion of the gender wage inequality. In Poland, accounting for the 
selections results in a higher estimated cost of motherhood, so that the wage inequality between 
mothers and non-mothers to a higher extent contributes to the gender wage differential.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we summarize theories on 
the link between family gaps and the gender wage gap, along with the existing literature that is 
relevant for the discussion. Section three describes the datasets used in the empirical research. In 
section four we present the empirical methodology that is used in the analysis. This section is divided 
into two parts. First part discusses the methodology and the problems involved in the estimation of 
the wage equations; the second part concentrates on the proposition of a gender wage gap 
decomposition that accounts for the family gaps in wages. In section five, we present the main 
results along with their interpretation, discussing the impact of the selection correction methodology 
as well. In section six we give concluding remarks.   
2. The family and gender wage gaps – how do children and family responsibilities contribute 
to gender wage gap formation? 
There exist several theories that aim to explain the existence of a wage premium caused by the 
parenthood. In the case of women, existing research distinguishes at least five possible sources of 
mother’s lower wages if compared with childless women: 1) loss in the human capital and its 
depreciation during the maternity leave and time out of the labor market due to childrearing 
(Buligescu et al., 2009, Waldfogel, 1998); 2) compensating wage differential theory – choosing 
“mother friendly” jobs and sectors; 3) unobserved heterogeneity of mothers and childless women; 4) 
Becker’s work effort theory stating that lower wages of mother result from their lower productivity 
caused by the presence of children; 5) discrimination based theories. Recently, more in-depth 
explanations have been tested, such as the differences in the labor market behavior measured by the 
intensity of the on-the-job search of mothers and childless women (Zhang, 2012) and changes in the 
non-wage aspects of the job around the motherhood (Felfe, 2012). Higher wages of fathers 
compared with non-fathers are in turn mainly explained by the theory of specialization. According to 
this theory women following the childbirth tend to specialize in the home production whereas men 
in the production delivered at the labor market (Lundberg and Rose, 2002, Killewald and Gough, 
2013). Higher wages of fathers are also associated with unobserved gains in their productivity 
induced by fatherhood or their positive discrimination by the employers caused by a higher valuation 
of father’s social status (Glauber, 2008).  
On the other hand, there are a large number of studies on the gender wage gap in general, and some 
surveys on the topic (international reviews include Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005), and 
Hersch (2006)). However, previous estimates do not aim to measure the contribution of the family 
gap to the overall gender gap, despite the fact that biological and cultural differences between the 
genders related to childbearing are clearly an important factor (Hersch, 2006).  
To the best of our knowledge, there are only few studies, which aim to link the wage effects of 
marital status, children, and thus, family commitments and the gender wage gap. First, Dolton and 
Makepeace (1986) argued that wage equations as well as the selection equations that pre-determine 
wages may differ based on the family status.
4
 Their findings indicate that single and married women 
have different selection specifications, and childless and child rearing women have different selection 
as well as earning equations. Based on the estimated earning equations, Dolton and Makepeace 
(1986) further decompose the gender wage gap according to Oaxaca-Blinder methodology. They 
estimate the unexplained components of the wage gaps between different subgroups of 
married/single and child rearing/childless men and women. Second, Waldfogel (1998) also argues 
that there exists a relation between the family gap and gender wage gap. She writes: ‘The family gap 
may be another reason why the gender gap is larger in the United States than in other countries’. 
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 They test  their hypothesis by investigating the significance of the dummy variables indicating parenthood and 
relationship status as well as the interaction terms both in earning and selection equations. 
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According to Waldfogel (1998) the prevalence of a gender wage gap in the U.S. may be caused by the 
relatively low provision of family policies such as maternity leave and child care (especially until 1993, 
when the U.S. did not have a national maternity leave policy). Based on the OLS wage equations, she 
decomposes the gender wage gap in 1980 and 1991 to find out that while the gender wage gap has 
declined, the relative contribution of the marital and parental characteristics and returns has 
increased.  
This evidence shows that although some attempts have been undertaken to combine the findings on 
the family and gender wage gaps, they are rather weak and suffer from methodological problems. 
Dolton and Makepeace (1986) do not provide estimates of the contribution of the family gap to the 
gender wage gap and investigate several gaps between male/female and marital and parenthood 
combinations. Waldfogel (1998) in turn uses standard OLS estimation, which estimates – especially 
for women – are likely to be biased due to the employment selection and endogeneity of children 
variables in the earning equation. In consequence, based on the existing literature, no strong 
evidence may be found on the role of parenthood in the formation of the gender wage gap and the 
extent children contribute to general gender wage gap inequality.  
3. Data description 
For the empirical analysis we use the data from the Household Budget Surveys (HBS) for Poland and 
Hungary. The databases contain the information on the demographic characteristics as well as the 
labor market activity and housing and living conditions. The design of the databases allows deriving 
the information on the family situation and parenthood status. The datasets have however certain 
drawbacks regarding the reported earnings that are further discussed below. Despite that, we still 
decide to use these datasets as they contain information that is crucial for the identification of our 
empirical models.
5
 Given the structure of other national datasets that could be used (for example 
Labor Force Survey) the HBSs seem to better meet the requirements regarding the collected 
information.
6 
  
For Poland we use recent data of 1999-2009 that are collected based on the same statistical 
methodology, which is a monthly rotation of the household. Each year approximately 37,000 
households take part in the survey but the total number of individuals varies across the years. The 
data on the labor market activity is collected only for individuals, who at the time of the interview 
were at least 15 years old. In Hungary, the household data is available for the years 2006-2009. 
Household income, spending, and characteristics are collected in March-April of each year. Labor 
market data is collected for individuals aged 16 or above, and this data refers to the current status 
(overall activity variable), or to the previous year (monthly activity variables).
7
 The data is also 
collected based on a rotational panel. About 1800 households are included in the survey.  
We consider only employed individuals who are not in self-employment, not working in agriculture 
and are of working age (16-64 for men and 16-59 for women). We further restrict the sample to 
individuals, who are 25 to 60 years old. We do so because in the analyzed counties individuals aged 
16-25 are very likely to be still in education, which makes the mechanism of selection into 
employment less clear.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is the natural logarithm of an hourly wage. For the Polish HBS, 
the data on earnings are collected based on monthly information meaning that only the average 
nominal monthly earnings are provided. Usually, the hourly wage could be derived using the 
                                                           
5
 That is the datasets contain unique variables that are essential for the identification of the model. These 
variables are listed in section 4.1., in which the exclusion restrictions are discussed.  
6
 For Poland the LFS does contain more precise wage information. It does not however provide the information 
on housing condition that we use for the identification.  
7
 For our sample dataset, we use the past year’s status, since this is the time period for which the wage 
information is available. 
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information on the exact hours worked. However, for Polish HBS there is no information on the 
hours worked and only an indicator of part time employment is available. Given the data structure, 
we decide to concentrate only on full time employees, whose average hours worked are likely to be 
less diverged than part-time workers.
8
 We recalculate the hourly wage assuming that the average 
number of hours worked per week is 40.
9
 Due to the limited data on some other variables, we 
additionally restrict the sample to most recent years 2005-2009.  
On the other hand, for the Hungarian dataset the information on the wages is collected based on a 
yearly basis. In order to make the data comparable, we therefore recalculate the statistic as the 
average monthly wage and also consider only full time workers. The Hungarian dataset does contain 
information on hours worked, thus it is possible to calculate hourly wages more accurately than in 
the case of Poland. However, due to our restriction of the sample to full time workers, this correction 
for actual hours worked does not make a significant difference, as most are reported as working the 
standard 40 hours per week.  
The principal variable in our analysis is a variable that indicates the presence of a child. The datasets 
do not contain precise information whether an individual has a child. We thus derive the variable 
indicating whether an individual is a child, and then calculate total number of children a mother or 
father has based on the indicators assigning the relation to the head of the family, as well as the 
variables indicating the id of a mother and a father. We define a child as an individual that is living in 
the household with his parents and is below 25 years old.  
On overall, the final sample for Poland consists of 105,183  individuals, out of which 61,326 are men, 
and 43,857 are women. Around 65 percent of individuals that are included in the sample have 
children. Women are found to be better educated than men, as the share of women with tertiary 
education is around 30 percent, whereas of men around 17 percent. Average hourly wage of women 
is around 8 PLN and of men around 10 PLN.
10
 For Hungary, the final sample is smaller and consists of 
10,821 out of which 6,045 are men and 4,776 are women. Similarly to Poland, around 60 percent of 
individuals have children. The hourly wage for men is around 890 HUF, and for women 766 HUF. 
Detailed summary statistics are presented in Table A. 1 and Table A. 2 in the Appendix. 
4. Econometric framework – Methodology 
4.1. Modeling the wage equations 
The estimation of the gap in wages caused by the parenthood is a methodologically complex problem 
as the decision whether to have a child may be related to the unobservable factors influencing the 
wages. These may include commitment and devotion to work and individual career orientation.  
Moreover, only selected individuals are observed working, which means that additionally there is a 
problem of the labor market (employment) selection. Most often in the previous literature on the 
family gaps, the above mentioned selection methodological concerns are investigated separately, 
with the consequence that the estimates corrected for employment selection are still likely to be 
biased if parenthood selection takes place, and the estimates that account for the heterogeneity of 
parents and non-parents are still biased due to employment selection. Since both selection processes 
are likely to be present simultaneously, truly unbiased estimators can be obtained only if both of 
them are accounted for. This can be achieved by applying a double selection model (Tunali 1986; Lee 
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 This is not such a significant restriction in the case of these two countries, as the share of part-time workers is 
low. In Hungary, about 4.7% of workers report working part-time, while in Poland, this is 9%. 
9
 This transformation does not impact the results, which means that the same results would be obtained if the 
wage rate was not recalculated.  
10
 Wages are expressed in constant prices from 2005. The wages for Poland are reported in Polish zlotys (PLN), 
whereas for Hungary in Hungarian forints (HUF).  
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1979; Ham 1982; Fisher et al. 1981) or the multinomial correction models (Lee, 1983; Dubin and 
McFadden, 1984; Dahl, 2002).
11
  
In this paper to report unbiased estimates of the wage equations for female and male parents and 
non-parents we apply multinomial correction model proposed by Dubin and McFadden (1984). As 
shown by Bourguignon et al. (2007) Dubin’s and McFadden’s model performs well and it is preferred 
to other selection models that involve several alternatives, such as Lee’s (1983) or Dahl’s models 
(2002). Below we outline Dubin’s and McFadden’s model, hereafter DMF, adapted to our conceptual 
framework.   
Individuals may choose particular employment-parenthood status out of four possible alternatives: 
(1) being working parent, (2) being working non-parent, (3) being not working parent and (4) being 
not working non-parent. The choice of the employment-parenthood status for men and women is 
modeled by the multinomial logit model of a form: 
12
 
,  ,	, 
 , ,             (1) 
Where j= {f, m} refers to females (f) and males (m) and s= {1,2,3,4} denotes four possible alternatives. 
The wage equation for each possible combination of employment-parenthood decision is given by: 
,  ,, 
 . .           (2) 
The bias of the estimates occurs because the error terms , and , may be correlated as there 
may exist some unobservable characteristics that affect both the choice of employment–parenthood 
status and wage rate. Assuming that the error terms are linearly related so that 
,,, … , ,   √ ∑ , ,   ,, where , denotes correlation coefficient 
between , and , as in equations (1) and (2) and selection equation is modeled with the use of 
multinomial logit, it can be shown that: 
,   ,|, ! "#$%&%,  ln ), ;                                                           (3) 
*,   ,|1 ! "#$%&%,  ,, -.*,/,01,/,0  ;      (4) 
Where ),  is a probability that the alternative s is preferred. Given the linearity assumption and 
model’s initial restriction of ∑ 2  0, this implies that the outcome equation conditional on 
choosing s=1 is given by: 
,  $,, 
  √ ∑ ,4 5 
,. -.*,/,0
1,/,0 
 ln ),6 
  7,.     (5) 
In the wage equations we include several control variables. Firstly, in accordance with Becker’s 
human capital theory (Becker, 1964) we apply a Mincerian form wage equation and control for the 
level of education and age of individuals.
13
 The decision to marry may also impact the labor market 
outcomes of men and women, which we account for via the inclusion of a dummy variable for a 
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 For a review of selection correction methods based on the multinomial logit model, see Bourguignon et al. 
(2007).  
12
 The first step of the model, that is the multinomial logit, requires that the assumption of the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is met. This restriction means that the evaluation of an alternative to another 
alternative does not change if other (irrelevant) alternative is added to the set of choice. Bourguignon et al. 
(2007) however show that DMF correction method performs well even if the IIA hypothesis is violated. Still, in 
order to test whether the IIA hypothesis holds we additionally perform diagnostic tests due to Hausman and 
Small Hsiao. The tests provide mixed results. The results are available from the authors upon the request. 
13
 The datasets we use do not provide the measure of labor market experience. Given that we decide to include 
both the age and education and not potential experience that could be also calculated. As shown by Anderson 
et al. (2003) potential experience overestimates women’s actual experience if women who have children take 
time off to raise the children.    
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marital status with single individuals left as the reference group.
14
 The parenthood effect we 
measure is therefore separated from the marriage effect. In line with existing literature that reports 
higher wages for individuals working in the private sector (Heitmueller, 2006), we also control for the 
sector of work.
15
 We do not account for the occupations, as the choice of occupation may be 
endogenous in the wage equation and correlated with the decision on the parenthood. It is also not 
clear whether occupational outcomes are already a result of discriminatory practices of the 
employers or pure gender–specific occupational choices.
16
 Finally, we control for regional disparities 
by accounting for the size of the place of living in terms of the total number of inhabitants, region of 
the country, and whether an individual is living in the capital, since these factors are likely to 
differentiate average wages.  
The identification of a model requires valid exclusion restrictions that are included in the estimation 
of the choice of employment-parenthood status and excluded from the wage regression. We use a 
set of exclusion restrictions that have been previously adapted in a similar research and are also 
available in our datasets (Joshi et al., 1999). These variables include: an indicator whether an 
individual has a spouse that is employed, the age of a spouse, total non-labor income available to the 
household, total number of individuals living in the household and housing conditions, which are 
total number of rooms and housing tenure.  
We report both the estimates from DMF model and OLS regressions to assess the bias. As the DMF 
estimation is based on two stage approach and standard errors from the second stage are not 
efficient, in the DMF estimations we provide bootstrapped standard errors. Given that the estimation 
of the family gap is usually carried out via the inclusion of a dummy variable indicating the presence 
of children in the wage equation (for example: Waldfogel, 1997, Walfogel, 1998), we additionally 
complement our analysis with this approach and compare the estimates for Poland and Hungary with 
previously obtained ones for other economies.  
4.2. Decomposing the gender wage gap that accounts for the parenthood 
The primary goal of this paper is to assess to what extent the existence of the family wage gap may 
contribute to the gender wage gap. To do so - based on the wage equations estimated using both the 
selection correction model and OLS - we propose an extension of standard gender wage gap 
decomposition commonly referred to Oaxaca-Blinder mean decomposition (1973).  
In the present setting, we have four different wage equations: for childless women, for mothers, for 
childless men, and for fathers. Denoting the separate wage equation for parents and non-parents as: 
89 :;  ;; 
  ;          (6) 
Where c = {CH, NCH} refers to two observed states of employment and parenthood status (CH - being 
working parent and NCH - being working non-parent) and j = {f, m} for female and male, we can write 
the mean wage levels for men and women as: 
89:<=======   ><89:<?@======== 
 1   ><89:<A?@==========       (7) 
89:B======   >B89:B?@======== 
 1  >B89:BA?@==========        (8) 
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 We restrict the sample to individuals who are either married or single. We do not consider divorced or 
widowed individuals as for these individuals the parenthood status may be incorrectly specified. Parenthood is 
defined as having a child that is still living in the household and is at most 25 years old. For divorced individuals 
we are therefore unable to identify correctly whether he or she has a child as the child is living only with one of 
the parents.   
15
 This is true only for Poland becuase for Hungary in the database there is no information on the sector of 
work.  
16
 As it is questionable whether to account for the occupational choices, we do however additionally run the 
analysis controlling for occupations. The results are comparable to the findings obtained when the 
occupational controls are excluded. 
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where >B and >< are the shares of women and men who have children. After very simple algebraic 
manipulation these can be rewritten as: 
89:<=======   ><*89:<?@========  89:<A?@========== 
 89:<A?@==========       (9) 
89:B======   >B*89:B?@========  89:BA?@========== 
 89:BA?@==========       (10) 
where the terms in parentheses are the family gaps in wages by gender. Incorporating the above 
equations to the standard mean gender wage gap decomposition, defined as a mean difference in 
log wages of men and women, we have: 
89 :<=========  89 :B=========   ><*89:<?@========  89:<A?@==========  >B*89:B?@========  89:BA?@========== 
  89:<A?@==========    89:BA?@===========       (11) 
The gender wage gap can be thus separated into three components that represent the family gap 
among men and women, and the gap in wages among non-parents. Note that because of the 
negative sign in front of the measure of the family gap among women, when the gap exists - that is 
when women with children earn lower wages - then it contributes positively towards the formation 
of the overall gender wage gap. Each of the three components may be additionally decomposed into 
explained (endowment) and unexplained (remuneration) components using Oaxaca and Blinder 
decomposition method.  
In the case of the wage equations corrected for the selection, on the right hand side of the estimated 
equations we will additionally have expressions that represent the correction terms. Usually the 
selection terms are treated in two manners. The first approach treats the selection terms as a 
separate component of the decomposition and portions the gap into explained, unexplained and 
selection parts. The second set of the studies subtracts the selection correction terms from both 
sides of the estimated equation and reports the gap in ‘potential’ (or offered) wages (Neuman and 
Oaxaca, 2004). Given that, we decide to interpret the selection terms as an additional selection 
component representing the part of the gap that is due to the difference in the selection patterns.   
5. Results 
5.1. Wage equations 
Detailed results from OLS and DMF estimations of the wage equations are presented in Appendix in 
Table A. 3 for Poland and Table A. 4 for Hungary. The OLS results for Poland show that full time 
female workers rather than a motherhood penalty receive a positive premium of 1.5 percent from 
their motherhood. For Hungary the respective estimate is around negative 1.9 percent but the result 
is not statistically significant. In line with the expectation, positive premium is present for fathers: in 
Poland full time male workers receive by 7.8 percent higher wages than men who do not have 
children, whereas in Hungary the respective premium is lower and equals to positive 1 percent. For 
Hungary the result is again not statistically significant.  
The estimated coefficients related to the variable indicating the individual marital status show that 
both in Poland and Hungary marriage has a positive impact on the wages of men. In Hungary, the 
effect is around 14 percent and in Poland around 17 percent. The effect of marriage for women in 
the case of Hungary is negative and equals to 4.6 percent and in the case of Poland to positive 1 
percent.  
The results are interesting when compared with the OLS estimates found for Western economies, 
especially the US (Budig and England, 2001; Korenman and Nuemark, 1992, Lundberg and Rose, 
2002). The estimates of the motherhood penalty for Poland and Hungary are much smaller, whereas 
the estimates of the effect of marriage are much higher, than the ones found for other economies. 
On the other hand, the effects of marriage present for men are much higher than the ones reported 
by Lundberg and Rose (2002) for the US. The results thus show that for Poland and Hungary it is 
mostly the marital not the parental status that is influencing the earnings of men and women. This 
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means that the specialization of men and women in the labor and household production is likely to 
be observed following the marriage itself and not the presence of children.  
The estimation output for the subsamples of individuals who do and do not have children shows that 
the returns from the observable characteristics, such as age and education, are different for parents 
and nonparents. The wage-age profiles are much steeper for nonparent – both men and women – 
than parents, which may reflect parents lower human capital accumulation due to the career 
interruptions caused by the parenthood. The returns from education are slightly higher for 
nonparents.  
The estimates corrected for the selection bias are presented in columns 7-10 in Table A. 3 (for 
Poland) and Table A. 4 (for Hungary). Both for Poland and Hungary, the correction terms are found to 
be significant showing that the selection is critical for a proper analysis of the family gaps among men 
and women. For both countries, in all the wage equations the F-tests of a joint significance of 
correction terms results in the rejection of a null hypothesis stating that the corrections have no 
effect on wages. 
17
 
The estimates of mother’s wage equation for Poland and Hungary show that there is a negative 
correlation between the unobservable factors influencing the wages of mothers and the 
unobservable determinants of the choice of being working and not having children. Such factors may 
include for example an ability to handle multi tasks and workload. This may be interpreted as a 
positive selection of women into the motherhood. The effect is highly statistically significant for 
Poland but weakly significant for Hungary. On the other hand, the positive coefficient related to the 
choice of being a not working mother shows that the unobservable factors related to the choice of 
this state are positively correlated with unobservable factors influencing wages of mothers. This 
finding shows that among mothers there is a negative selection into the employment. For Poland we 
additionally observe a negative selection into employment among working non-mothers (column 7 
Table A. 3); this effect is not found for Hungary.  
The estimates of wage equations for men for Poland and Hungary show mixed results. In Poland, it is 
the employment selection that is mostly important. In the case of working fathers in Poland we 
observe a positive correlation between unobservable factors that influence father’s wages and 
unobservable determinants of being a not working father. There is also a negative relation between 
unobservable factors that are influencing the choice of being a not working non-father and 
unobservable determinants of father’s wage. The findings thus show that working fathers in Poland 
are negatively selected into employment out of all fathers and positively selected into the family-
employment status if compared to not working childless men. In the case of wage equation of 
childless working men the selection coefficients show that unobservable factors influencing their 
wages are negatively related to unobservable factors related to the choice of being a working parent. 
Such unobservable factors may include for example devotion and attachment to the workplace and 
employment. The same effect is found for Hungary but it is not statistically significant.  
The estimates of the returns from the human capital in the wage equations corrected for the 
selections are in general higher than the ones obtained from the uncorrected estimations. Both the 
returns from the education and age are thus overestimated if the selections are not accounted for.  
5.2. Decomposition of the gender wage gap that accounts for the family gaps in wages 
The results of the gender wage gap decomposition that shows the relative contribution of the family 
gaps are presented in Table 1. Detailed results that involve the family gaps decompositions are 
presented in the Appendix. We report both the decomposition based on OLS and DMF and compare 
the role of selection processes. 
                                                           
17
 In the case of Hungary the F-test of a joint significance of selection terms results in the value of 7.7 (p=0.0) 
for mothers, 2.39 (p=0.067) for non-mothers, 3.94 (p=0.008) for fathers and 6.28 (p=0.0) for non-fathers. In the 
case of Poland the respective values are 15.56 (p=0.0), 3.34 (p=0.0), 176.95 (p=0.0), 80.22 (p=0.0). 
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Table 1. Contribution of the family gaps among men and women to total gender wage differential for Poland and 
Hungary 
Poland Hungary 
Gender wage gap 
(GWG) 0.187 0.104 
OLS DMF OLS DMF 
  Estimate 
% of 
GWG Estimate 
% of 
GWG Estimate 
% of 
GWG Estimate 
% of 
GWG 
Family gap women -0.027 9% -0.027 9% -0.081 49% -0.081 49% 
Explained -0.040 14% -0.025 9% -0.082 50% -0.064 38% 
Unexplained 0.014 -5% -0.029 10% 0.000 0% 0.054 -33% 
Selection NO NO 0.027 -9% NO NO -0.072 44% 
Family gap men 0.127 45% 0.127 45% 0.090 51% 0.090 51% 
Explained 0.047 16% 0.031 11% 0.080 46% 0.058 33% 
Unexplained 0.080 28% 0.141 50% 0.010 6% 0.015 9% 
Selection NO NO -0.046 -16% NO NO 0.016 9% 
GWG childless 
individuals 0.087 46% 0.087 46% -0.001 -1% -0.001 -1% 
Explained -0.106 -50% -0.084 -45% -0.123 -117% -0.114 -109% 
Unexplained 0.192 97% 0.125 67% 0.121 116% 0.193 185% 
Selection NO NO 0.046 25% NO NO -0.080 -77% 
Note: Detailed estimation results are included in the Appendix. 
For Poland, the gender wage gap that shows the difference in the wages of men and women 
expressed as a percentage of the average men’s wage, accounts for 18.7 percent.
18
 In Hungary, the 
respective gap is lower than in the case of Poland, and accounts for around 10.4 percent.
19 
 Both in 
Poland and Hungary, the decomposition that uses OLS wage estimation results shows that roughly 
half of the gender wage gap is due to fathers’ relatively higher wages (family gap among men). For 
Poland, the family gap among men is around 13% and it constitutes 45% of the total gender wage 
gap. The respective family gap among women is around 3 percent. This fact contributes to the overall 
gender wage gap in only 9 percent. The rest of the gender wage gap (46 percent) is due to the gender 
wage inequality among childless individuals. In Hungary, the family gap among men is smaller than in 
Poland and it is equal to 9%. The gap makes up 51% of the total gender gap. On contrary, the family 
gap in wages of women in Hungary is higher than in Poland and is equal to negative 8 percent. This 
fact accounts for the remaining 50 percent of the total gender wage gap. The results thus show that 
while in Poland, parenthood-based wage inequalities contribute to the gender wage gap mostly 
because of men’s wage premium from being a father, in Hungary the gender wage gap may be 
attributed to unequal wage distribution of fathers and non-fathers as well as mothers and non-
mothers. Detailed decomposition results (Table A. 5 and Table A. 6 in the Appendix) show that these 
parenthood-based inequalities in Hungary are mostly explained by the distribution of observable 
characteristics. In Poland men’s higher wages are only partly explained by father’s higher human 
capital endowments.  
                                                           
18
 Detailed decomposition results shows that the gap is found to be not explained by the differences in the 
distribution of the characteristics. This means that if men in Poland followed the distribution of women’s 
education than their wage would be actually higher and the average gender wage gap would increase.   
19
 Similarly to the gender wage gap in Poland, the explained portion of the gender wage gap is negative (mostly 
due to educational differences, since female employees are relatively highly qualified). 
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Once we account for the selections of individuals into the employment and parenthood status, the 
findings related to the parenthood based sources of the gender wage inequality significantly change. 
For Hungary, we observe that the gap in wages that is due to parenthood is overestimated because 
of the differences in the selection patterns between mothers and non-mothers. The decomposition 
results show that women’s selection nearly entirely explains the existence of the female family gap in 
wages. For men we observe that the differences in the selection processes among fathers and non-
fathers account for less than one fifth of the family gap among men (18 percent, see Table A. 8) and 
only 9 percent of total gender wage gap. This means that if the selections are accounted for, we find 
slightly lower family gap among men. On the other hand, the raw gap among childless men and 
women in Hungary is small and insignificant (-1 percent) but the differences in selection process lead 
to its high increase.  
For Poland we observe somehow different results when the selections are controlled. For women, 
differences in the selection processes cause the true family gap to be higher than the observed one. 
The differences in the selection processes among mothers and childless women, and especially 
mother’s positive selection into working and having kids, thus contribute towards the widening of 
the gap in their average wages. Consequently the gap in mother’s and non-mother’s wages 
constitutes a significant part of the gender wage differential. For men we observe similar results. The 
difference in the selection processes among fathers and non-fathers is not explaining the gap in their 
wages, but contributes towards its increase. The same argument thus follows, that the gap in father’s 
and non-father’ wages to a higher extent contributes towards the persistence of the gender wage 
gap. In consequence of the selections, the true gender wage gap among childless individuals in 
Poland is likely to be smaller than the observed one. 
To conclude, the decomposition results show that accounting for the selections is critical for the 
analysis of gender and family based inequalities. Wage inequalities due to parenthood explain the 
gender wage gaps in Poland and Hungary in a different manner. In Hungary, women’s selection into 
employment and parenthood entirely explains the gap in their wages, and the gender wage gap is 
mostly due to the high difference in the wages of males and females who do not have children and 
the family gap among men. In Poland, however, the female’s family gap is underestimated and 
accounting for the selection leads to its increase. In consequence, higher part of the gender wage gap 
is attributable to mother’s lower earnings compared to women who do not raise kids. Men’s 
selection also causes the family gap among men to increase, so that it also constitutes a significant 
source of gender wage inequality. This means that while in Hungary the parenthood based 
inequalities explain the gender wage gap mostly via father’s wage premium, in Poland the gender 
wage gap is largely due to the prevalence of both mother’s labor market disadvantage and father’s 
positive wage premium. When looking at the detailed decomposition results of the family gaps 
among men and women (Table A. 7 and Table A. 8) it is clear that the existence of the family gap 
among men is largely unexplained by the differences in the distribution of their characteristics 
suggesting that unobservable factors, that may include father’s longer working hours, which we do 
not fully control for, as well as employer’s positive discrimination,  may lead to their wage premiums.   
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes family gaps among men and women and their relative contribution to the overall 
gender wage inequality. The analysis is carried out for two transition countries: Poland and Hungary 
that differ in the prevailing family models and policies available to women and families with children.  
In the paper we present and discuss two main methodological problems that cause OLS estimation of 
the wage inequality by parenthood and gender to provide bias results. We address these problems 
simultaneously by adopting the multiple selection model due to Dubin and McFadden (1984). The 
results of this paper show that indeed the selection processes are critical for an identification of the 
relation between parenthood and men’s and women’s wages. While the selection into employment 
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is found to be important for wage estimates of both men and women, the selection into parenthood 
is mostly relevant for women.  
The results of this paper bring new insights regarding the sources of the wage inequality by gender. 
Based on the modification of standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition we show that wage 
inequalities due to parenthood, both among women and men, constitute a significant part of the 
gender wage gap. This is true both for Poland and Hungary. In Hungary mothers are found to pay a 
high penalty for their motherhood in a form of lower wages. The gap is however entirely explained 
by women’s selection into employment and parenthood. The existence of the gender wage gap is 
thus largely attributable to the gender wage gap that prevails among childless individuals and the 
fact that men who have children receive substantially higher wages. For Poland when selections are 
considered, we find much higher parenthood based wage inequality among women. The cost of 
motherhood in Poland is therefore much higher than in Hungary that offers women better chances 
to combine work and family related responsibilities. The divergence of men’s and women’s wages in 
Poland is thus predominately caused by women’s higher cost of motherhood and men’s fatherhood 
wage premiums.  
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APPENDIX  
Table A. 1. Summary statistics for Poland, sample of full time working individuals aged 25-60. 
Variables 
Poland 
Men Women Women 
parent 
Women 
non-parent 
Men 
parent 
Men non-
parent 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Age 40.58 40.526 40.623 40.351 41.035 39.704 
No education and less than 
primary 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 
Primary education 0.071 0.048 0.048 0.047 0.068 0.077 
Vocational education 0.717 0.54 0.578 0.472 0.743 0.667 
High school 0.045 0.093 0.092 0.095 0.043 0.048 
Tertiary education 0.167 0.319 0.282 0.386 0.145 0.208 
Married 0.855 0.847 0.974 0.618 0.986 0.603 
Parent 0.658 0.643     
Private sector 0.694 0.515 0.51 0.525 0.682 0.717 
City 500+ th. 0.11 0.141 0.123 0.175 0.098 0.133 
City 200-500 th. 0.091 0.104 0.1 0.11 0.087 0.097 
City 100-200 th. 0.075 0.08 0.081 0.08 0.077 0.072 
City 20-100 th. 0.192 0.2 0.201 0.199 0.195 0.186 
City less 20 th. 0.116 0.125 0.129 0.117 0.119 0.11 
Village 0.416 0.35 0.366 0.32 0.423 0.401 
Region Central 0.199 0.225 0.22 0.236 0.194 0.207 
Region North 0.148 0.14 0.141 0.139 0.151 0.142 
Region East 0.158 0.156 0.158 0.15 0.161 0.153 
Region North-West 0.167 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.165 0.172 
Region South-West 0.107 0.103 0.1 0.108 0.102 0.116 
Region South 0.222 0.217 0.222 0.208 0.227 0.211 
Warsaw region 0.135 0.156 0.15 0.165 0.133 0.138 
Hourly wage 10.244 8.341 8.232 8.538 10.698 9.372 
Ln of hourly wage 2.2 2.013 2.004 2.03 2.244 2.117 
Number of kids   1.745  1.859  
Household's financial income 2.323 2.456 2.427 2.508 2.146 2.661 
Household's benefits 3.795 3.853 2.632 6.055 2.476 6.328 
Spouse that is employed 0.532 0.695 0.823 0.463 0.618 0.367 
Total number of people living 
in the HH 
3.779 3.543 3.929 2.847 4.077 3.205 
Parent living in the household 0.089 0.083 0.08 0.089 0.085 0.096 
Housing tenure 19.276 19.21 17.378 22.512 16.792 24.051 
Partner's age 2.976 3.053 3.108 2.955 2.973 2.982 
Total number of rooms 39.473 43.791 42.925 46.183 38.693 41.813 
No observations 61326 43857 28207 15650 40336 20990 
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Table A. 2. Summary statistics for Hungary, sample of full time working individuals, aged 25-60. 
Variables 
Hungary 
Men Women Women 
parent 
Women 
non-parent 
Men parent Men non-
parent 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Age 40.299 41.791 43.248 39.256 42.487 37.024 
No education and less than 
primary 
0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.008 
Primary education 0.086 0.091 0.1 0.075 0.091 0.077 
Vocational education 0.644 0.528 0.57 0.454 0.662 0.618 
High school 0.058 0.058 0.053 0.067 0.05 0.069 
Tertiary education 0.206 0.318 0.272 0.398 0.192 0.229 
Married 0.681 0.761 0.941 0.449 0.937 0.297 
Parent 0.6 0.635     
Urbanization high density 0.312 0.326 0.277 0.411 0.272 0.371 
Urbanization medium 
density 
0.204 0.211 0.208 0.217 0.206 0.202 
Urbanization rare density 0.484 0.463 0.515 0.372 0.522 0.428 
Region Central 0.251 0.265 0.224 0.337 0.214 0.306 
Region Central 
Transdanubia 
0.111 0.103 0.104 0.101 0.111 0.112 
Region Western 
Transdanubia 
0.122 0.114 0.126 0.094 0.127 0.113 
Region South Transdanubia 0.088 0.094 0.098 0.085 0.092 0.081 
Region Northern Hungary 0.132 0.125 0.131 0.114 0.138 0.124 
Region Northern Plains 0.155 0.156 0.183 0.11 0.182 0.115 
Region Southern Plains 0.141 0.143 0.134 0.159 0.135 0.148 
Hourly wage 887.476 766.216 737.301 816.53 925.682 830.286 
Ln of hourly wage 6.6 6.495 6.465 6.547 6.636 6.546 
Number of kids   1.668  1.812  
Household's financial 
income 
0.222 0.239 0.309 0.117 0.305 0.097 
Household's benefits 1.937 1.061 1.573 0.171 3.012 0.327 
Spouse that is employed 0.485 0.567 0.675 0.378 0.611 0.296 
Total number of people 
living in the HH 
3.489 3.323 3.856 2.396 4.01 2.707 
Parent living in the 
household 
0.065 0.07 0.081 0.052 0.076 0.047 
Housing tenure 17.494 18.698 18.421 19.179 15.268 20.825 
Partner's age 2.842 2.883 3.033 2.621 2.965 2.658 
Total number of rooms 40.208 46.69 46.623 46.89 39.935 41.201 
No of observations 6045 4776 3033 1743 3624 2421 
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Table A. 3. OLS and DMF regression results for Poland – sample of full time non-agricultural and not self-employed workers aged 25-60; dependent variables logarithm of an hourly wage. 
Variables 
OLS DMF correction 
women men 
women 
parent 
women 
nonparent men parent 
men 
nonparent 
women 
parent 
women 
nonparent men parent 
men 
nonparent 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Parent 0.015*** 0.078***                 
  (0.005) (0.004) 
   
    
Married 0.010* 0.174*** -0.015 0.001 0.053*** 0.166*** 0.047*** 0.036*** 0.080*** 0.123*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018) (0.006) (0.021) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) 
Age 31 to 36 0.121*** 0.083*** 0.097*** 0.127*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.102*** 0.136*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Age 37 to 42 0.160*** 0.095*** 0.134*** 0.176*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.130*** 0.184*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age 43 to 48 0.182*** 0.069*** 0.151*** 0.220*** 0.049*** 0.097*** 0.133*** 0.202*** 0.110*** 0.125*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age 49 to 54 0.218*** 0.049*** 0.178*** 0.250*** 0.014* 0.093*** 0.145*** 0.234*** 0.078*** 0.126*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Age 55 to 60 0.270*** 0.043*** 0.228*** 0.296*** -0.010 0.077*** 0.211*** 0.363*** 0.053*** 0.164*** 
  (0.012) (0.007) (0.021) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.026) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) 
Primary 
education 
0.093 -0.035 0.168*** -0.101 -0.175 0.112 0.127 -0.300 -0.091 0.000 
(0.073) (0.103) (0.048) (0.194) (0.166) (0.107) (0.083) (0.191) (0.147) (0.104) 
Vocational 
education 
0.281*** 0.142 0.334*** 0.129 0.006 0.288*** 0.258** -0.123 0.056 0.141 
(0.073) (0.103) (0.047) (0.194) (0.166) (0.107) (0.083) (0.191) (0.147) (0.105) 
High school 0.334*** 0.184* 0.385*** 0.184 0.054 0.317*** 0.306*** -0.073 0.102 0.168 
(0.073) (0.104) (0.048) (0.194) (0.167) (0.108) (0.083) (0.190) (0.150) (0.104) 
Tertiary 
education 
0.682*** 0.533*** 0.750*** 0.511*** 0.437*** 0.629*** 0.641*** 0.217 0.466*** 0.456*** 
  (0.073) (0.104) (0.047) (0.194) (0.166) (0.107) (0.084) (0.191) (0.148) (0.107) 
Private sector -0.005 -0.036*** -0.013*** 0.012* -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.012*** 0.012* -0.032*** -0.035*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
CORRECTIONS 
    
Working parent     
 
-0.033* 
 
-0.126*** 
      
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.012) 
Working     -0.072*** -0.038 
16 
 
nonparent 
      (0.029) (0.024) 
Not working 
parent     
0.166*** -0.001 0.436*** 0.069*** 
      (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.021) 
Not working 
nonparent     
-0.077* 0.088*** -0.330*** 0.099*** 
              (0.043) (0.021) (0.042) (0.018) 
Number of 
observations 
43 853 61 317 28 204 15 649 40 332 20 985 28 204 15 649 40 332 20 985 
R2 0.313 0.248 0.319 0.307 0.231 0.257 0.321 0.311 0.241 0.264 
           Notes:  1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2) Control variables: size of the place of residence, regional dummies, and year fixed effects.  
3) Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors in OLS: White robust standard errors; Standard errors in DMF: bootstrapped at 100 replications. 
 
Table A. 4. OLS and DMF regression results for Hungary – sample of full time non-agricultural and not self-employed workers aged 25-60; dependent variables logarithm of an hourly wage. 
Variables 
OLS DMF correction 
women men 
women 
parent 
women 
nonparent men parent 
men 
nonparent 
women 
parent 
women 
nonparent men parent 
men 
nonparent 
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se 
Parent -0.019 0.010                 
  (0.017) (0.019) 
   
      
Married -0.046** 0.140*** 0.049 -0.078*** 0.111** 0.139*** 0.018 -0.045 0.049 0.073* 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.037) (0.025) (0.046) (0.029) (0.058) (0.037) (0.062) (0.040) 
Age 31 to 36 0.102*** 0.116*** 0.092** 0.118*** 0.132*** 0.091*** 0.057 0.127*** 0.096** 0.086*** 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.045) (0.031) (0.034) (0.028) (0.064) (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) 
Age 37 to 42 0.191*** 0.140*** 0.185*** 0.232*** 0.149*** 0.106*** 0.129** 0.242*** 0.108*** 0.136*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.043) (0.056) (0.036) (0.037) (0.064) (0.058) (0.036) (0.037) 
Age 43 to 48 0.207*** 0.109*** 0.203*** 0.215*** 0.104*** 0.140*** 0.138** 0.215*** 0.069** 0.184*** 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.043) (0.042) (0.035) (0.046) (0.066) (0.047) (0.033) (0.048) 
Age 49 to 54 0.216*** 0.083*** 0.236*** 0.186*** 0.102*** 0.033 0.173*** 0.166*** 0.091** 0.097** 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.045) (0.032) (0.036) (0.041) (0.059) (0.044) (0.034) (0.049) 
Age 55 to 60 0.233*** 0.044 0.234*** 0.252*** -0.018 0.118** 0.227*** 0.211*** -0.001 0.211*** 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.048) (0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051) (0.059) 
Primary 0.478** 0.134 0.575* 0.290 0.154 0.115 0.501* 0.306 0.110 0.055 
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education 
(0.241) (0.098) (0.341) (0.308) (0.169) (0.100) (0.290) (0.322) (0.17) (0.101) 
Vocational 
education 
0.717*** 0.309*** 0.812** 0.529* 0.338** 0.292*** 0.681** 0.561* 0.273 0.170* 
(0.240) (0.095) (0.340) (0.306) (0.167) (0.094) (0.282) (0.312) (0.18) (0.103) 
High school 0.859*** 0.499*** 0.910*** 0.739** 0.562*** 0.431*** 0.760*** 0.781** 0.489** 0.279** 
(0.241) (0.099) (0.341) (0.308) (0.171) (0.102) (0.284) (0.315) (0.187) (0.12) 
Tertiary 
education 
1.262*** 0.970*** 1.338*** 1.094*** 1.064*** 0.867*** 1.181*** 1.133*** 0.990*** 0.717*** 
  (0.240) (0.096) (0.340) (0.306) (0.168) (0.097) (0.283) (0.310) (0.187) (0.107) 
CORRECTIONS 
    
Working parent     
 
0.061 
 
-0.155 
      
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.094) 
Working 
nonparent     
-0.105 
 
0.160* 
      (0.075) 
 
(0.093) 
Not working 
parent     
0.112** 0.044 0.061 0.039 
      (0.050) (0.147) (0.107) (0.134) 
Not working 
nonparent     
0.045 -0.099 -0.162 0.174** 
              (0.094) (0.081) (0.158) (0.079) 
Number of 
observations 
4 776 6 045 3 033 1 743 3 624 2 421 3 033 1 743 3 624 2 421 
R2 0.357 0.291 0.341 0.392 0.312 0.265 0.341 0.386 0.310 0.264 
Notes:  1) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
2) Control variables: size of the place of residence, regional dummies, and year fixed effects.  
3) Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors in OLS: White robust standard errors; Standard errors in DMF: bootstrapped at 100 replications. 
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Table A. 5. Contribution of the family gaps into the gender wage gap for Poland – based on the uncorrected estimates 
Gender wage gap 0.187 
Family gap among women 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap -0.027 100% 0.017 9% 
Explained total -0.040 152% 0.026 14% 
by     
Age 0.011 -39% -0.007 -4% 
Education -0.040 148% 0.026 14% 
Marriage 0.011 -41% -0.007 -4% 
Rest -0.022 82% 0.014 8% 
Unexplained total 0.014 -52% -0.009 -5% 
by     
Age -0.028 103% 0.018 10% 
Education 0.191 -709% -0.123 -66% 
Marriage -0.022 80% 0.014 7% 
Rest -0.128 474% 0.082 44% 
Family gap among men 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap 0.127 100% 0.083 45% 
Explained total 0.047 37% 0.031 16% 
by     
Age 0.017 13% 0.011 6% 
Education -0.017 -14% -0.011 -6% 
Marriage 0.068 54% 0.045 24% 
Rest -0.021 -16% -0.014 -7% 
Unexplained total 0.080 63% 0.053 28% 
by   0.000   
Age -0.049 -39% -0.032 -17% 
Education -0.250 -197% -0.165 -88% 
Marriage -0.112 -88% -0.074 -40% 
Rest 0.492 387% 0.323 173% 
Gender wage gap among nonparents 
  Estimates GWG decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
GWG 0.087 100% 0.087 46% 
Explained total -0.094 -108% -0.094 -50% 
by     
Age -0.004 -4% -0.004 -2% 
Education -0.077 -89% -0.077 -41% 
Marriage -0.001 -1% -0.001 0% 
Rest -0.012 -14% -0.012 -6% 
Unexplained total 0.181 208% 0.181 97% 
by     
Age -0.074 -85% -0.074 -39% 
Education 0.109 126% 0.109 58% 
Marriage 0.095 109% 0.095 51% 
Rest 0.050 57% 0.050 27% 
Notes:  
1) Column 1 presents the estimates of the family gap decompositions for men and women and gender wage gap 
decomposition among childless individuals; 
2) Column 2 presents the decomposition of the family gap decompositions for men and women and gender wage gap 
decomposition among childless individuals showing the percentage of the gap that is due to the certain components 
3) Column 3 represents the contribution of the family gaps among men and women and gender wage gap among childless 
individuals and their components    
4) Column 4 represents percentage contribution of the family gaps among men and women and gender wage gap among 
childless individuals and their components to the overall gender wage gap 
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Table A. 6. Contribution of the family gaps into the gender wage gap for Hungary – based on the uncorrected estimates 
Gender wage gap 0.104 
Family gap among women 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap -0.081 100% 0.051 49.3% 
Explained total -0.082 101% 0.052 49.5% 
by     
Age 0.078 -96% -0.049 -47.2% 
Education -0.086 105% 0.054 51.9% 
Marriage -0.038 47% 0.024 23.0% 
Rest -0.036 44% 0.023 21.9% 
Unexplained total 0.000 -1% 0.000 -0.3% 
by      
Age 0.021 -26% -0.014 -13.0% 
Education 0.258 -317% -0.163 -156.1% 
Marriage 0.115 -141% -0.073 -69.6% 
Rest -0.394 484% 0.249 238.5% 
Family gap among men 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap 0.090 100% 0.054 51.4% 
Explained total 0.080 89% 0.048 45.8% 
by     
Age 0.038 42% 0.023 21.7% 
Education -0.028 -31% -0.017 -15.9% 
Marriage 0.088 98% 0.053 50.3% 
Rest -0.018 -20% -0.011 -10.4% 
Unexplained total 0.010 11% 0.006 5.6% 
by      
Age 0.006 7% 0.004 3.5% 
Education 0.099 110% 0.059 56.6% 
Marriage -0.018 -20% -0.011 -10.3% 
Rest -0.077 -86% -0.046 -44.2% 
Gender wage gap among nonparents 
  Estimates GWG decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
GWG -0.001 100% -0.001 -1.0% 
Explained total -0.123 11586% -0.123 -117.3% 
by     
Age -0.003 316% -0.003 -3.2% 
Education -0.097 9173% -0.097 -92.9% 
Marriage -0.015 1464% -0.015 -14.8% 
Rest -0.007 633% -0.007 -6.4% 
Unexplained total 0.121 -11486% 0.121 116.3% 
by      
Age -0.074 7009% -0.074 -71.0% 
Education -0.214 20244% -0.214 -205.0% 
Marriage 0.093 -8783% 0.093 88.9% 
Rest 0.317 -29956% 0.317 303.3% 
Notes: Columns description as in Table A. 5. 
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Table A. 7. Contribution of the family gaps into the gender wage gap for Poland – based on the corrected estimates 
GWG 0.187 
Family gap among women 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap women -0.027 100% 0.017 9% 
Explained -0.025 92% 0.016 9% 
by   
Marriage 0.013 -48% -0.008 -4% 
Age 0.019 -69% -0.012 -6% 
Education -0.036 132% 0.023 12% 
Rest -0.021 78% 0.013 7% 
Unexplained -0.029 107% 0.019 10% 
by   
Marriage 0.011 -40% -0.007 -4% 
Age -0.055 204% 0.035 19% 
Education 0.395 -1463% -0.254 -136% 
Rest -0.380 1407% 0.244 131% 
Selection 0.027 -102% -0.018 -9% 
Family gap among men 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap men 0.127 100% 0.083 45% 
Explained 0.031 25% 0.021 11% 
by   
Marriage 0.047 37% 0.031 17% 
Age 0.022 17% 0.014 8% 
Education -0.018 -14% -0.012 -6% 
Rest -0.019 -15% -0.012 -7% 
Unexplained 0.141 111% 0.093 50% 
by   
Marriage -0.042 -33% -0.028 -15% 
Age -0.017 -13% -0.011 -6% 
Education -0.071 -56% -0.046 -25% 
Rest 0.271 213% 0.178 95% 
Selection -0.046 -36% -0.030 -16% 
Gender wage gap among nonparents 
  Estimates GWG decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
GWG childless 
individuals 0.087 100% 0.087 46% 
Explained -0.084 -97% -0.084 -45% 
by     
Marriage -0.002 -2% -0.002 -1% 
Age -0.003 -3% -0.003 -2% 
Education -0.062 -71% -0.062 -33% 
Rest -0.018 -21% -0.018 -10% 
Unexplained 0.125 144% 0.125 67% 
by     
Marriage 0.053 61% 0.053 29% 
Age -0.068 -78% -0.068 -36% 
Education 0.254 292% 0.254 136% 
Rest -0.114 -132% -0.114 -61% 
Selection 0.046 53% 0.046 25% 
Notes: Columns description as in Table A. 5. 
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Table A. 8. Contribution of the family gaps into the gender wage gap for Hungary – based on the corrected estimates 
GWG 0.104 
Family gap among women 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap women -0.081 100% 0.051 49% 
Explained -0.064 78% 0.040 38% 
by     
Marriage -0.022 27% 0.014 13% 
Age 0.076 -93% -0.048 -46% 
Education -0.081 99% 0.051 49% 
Rest -0.037 45% 0.023 22% 
Unexplained 0.054 -67% -0.034 -33% 
by     
Marriage 0.060 -73% -0.038 -36% 
Age -0.059 73% 0.037 36% 
Education 0.100 -123% -0.063 -60% 
Rest -0.046 57% 0.029 28% 
Selection -0.072 89% 0.046 44% 
Family gap among men 
  Estimates Family gap decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
Family gap men 0.090 100% 0.054 51% 
Explained 0.058 65% 0.035 33% 
by     
Marriage 0.047 52% 0.028 27% 
Age 0.048 54% 0.029 28% 
Education -0.024 -26% -0.014 -14% 
Rest -0.013 -15% -0.008 -8% 
Unexplained 0.015 17% 0.009 9% 
by     
Marriage -0.023 -26% -0.014 -13% 
Age -0.049 -55% -0.030 -28% 
Education 0.136 152% 0.081 78% 
Rest -0.048 -54% -0.029 -28% 
Selection 0.016 18% 0.010 9% 
Gender wage gap among nonparents 
  Estimates GWG decomposition contribution to GWG %contribution to GWG 
GWG childless 
individuals -0.001 100% -0.001 -1% 
Explained -0.114 10804% -0.114 -109% 
by     
Marriage -0.011 1051% -0.011 -11% 
Age -0.006 546% -0.006 -6% 
Education -0.093 8782% -0.093 -89% 
Rest -0.004 425% -0.004 -4% 
Unexplained 0.193 -18271% 0.193 185% 
by     
Marriage 0.053 -5032% 0.053 51% 
Age -0.028 2680% -0.028 -27% 
Education -0.396 37422% -0.396 -379% 
Rest 0.564 -53340% 0.564 540% 
Selection -0.080 7567% -0.080 -77% 
Notes: Columns description as in Table A. 5. 
 

